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An outstanding open problem is whether collective social phenomena occurring over short
timescales can systematically reduce cultural heterogeneity in the long run, and whether offline
and online human interactions contribute differently to the process. Theoretical models suggest
that short-term collective behavior and long-term cultural diversity are mutually excluding, since
they require very different levels of social influence. The latter jointly depends on two factors: the
topology of the underlying social network and the overlap between individuals in multidimensional
cultural space. However, while the empirical properties of social networks are well understood, lit-
tle is known about the large-scale organization of real societies in cultural space, so that random
input specifications are necessarily used in models. Here we use a large dataset to perform a high-
dimensional analysis of the scientific beliefs of thousands of Europeans. We find that inter-opinion
correlations determine a nontrivial ultrametric hierarchy of individuals in cultural space, a result
unaccessible to one-dimensional analyses and in striking contrast with random assumptions. When
empirical data are used as inputs in models, we find that ultrametricity has strong and counterin-
tuitive effects, especially in the extreme case of long-range online-like interactions bypassing social
ties. On short time-scales, it strongly facilitates a symmetry-breaking phase transition triggering
coordinated social behavior. On long time-scales, it severely suppresses cultural convergence by
restricting it within disjoint groups. We therefore find that, remarkably, the empirical distribution
of individuals in cultural space appears to optimize the coexistence of short-term collective behav-
ior and long-term cultural diversity, which can be realized simultaneously for the same moderate
level of mutual influence. This also shows that long-range interactions may simultaneously enhance
coordination and sustain diversity.
PACS numbers: Valid PACS appear here
I. INTRODUCTION
How a society spontaneously organizes macroscopically
from the microscopic, uncoordinated behavior of individ-
uals is one of the most studied and exciting problems of
modern science [1–3]. Collective social phenomena are
observed in different aspects of everyday life, including
the onset of large-scale popularity and fashion (both of-
fline [4, 5] and online [6, 7]), the existence of large fluc-
tuations and herding behavior in financial markets [8–
10], the spontaneous emergence of order in traffic and
crowd dynamics [11], the properties of voting dynam-
ics [4, 12], the structure of country-wide communication
networks [3, 13, 14], the spreading of habits, fear, gos-
sip, rumors, etc. [2, 11]. When collective phenomena
occur, large parts of a population turn out to be globally
correlated as a result of the combination of many local in-
teractions, even if no centralized mechanism takes place.
Importantly, the collective outcome is different from a
mere superposition of non-interacting individual behav-
iors, and contrasts the ‘representative agent’ scenario of-
ten postulated in economic theories. The different char-
acteristics, choices and behaviors of individuals, rather
than being ‘averaged out’ in the long run and at a large
scale, may in some circumstances become amplified at
the societal level [1]. The observation of these phenom-
ena, also enabled recently by large-scale electronic plat-
forms where people can exchange information with un-
precedented speed and breadth (see Appendix for a more
detailed discussion), poses the question of whether the
diversity of behaviors, attitudes and opinions is destined
to be progressively reduced in the long run. Naively, one
expects that stronger collective social phenomena taking
place on short timescales may gradually result in more
homogeneous behaviors in the long term.
This picture is reinforced by the fact that similar mech-
anism are believed to be among the key driving forces of
both collective social behavior [1, 7] and cultural con-
vergence [15]. Various simplified models have been in-
troduced to quantitatively simulate the fate of cultural
diversity and the dynamics of opinions in large groups
[2, 11, 12]. In both cases, the main hypothesized mech-
anisms are the tendency of social interactions to favor
convergence and consensus (social influence [16]) and the
inverse tendency of culturally similar individuals to in-
teract more than dissimilar ones (homophily) [15]. Re-
cently, the concept of homophily has been enriched with
the quantitative notion of bounded confidence, according
to which people are not culturally influenced by too dis-
similar peers [2, 17, 18]. Quantitatively, when the opin-
ions or cultural traits of an individual are represented as a
2scalar or vector variable, the bounded confidence hypoth-
esis results in two individuals being potentially influenced
by each other only if the distance between their associ-
ated variables is smaller than a certain threshold, rep-
resenting the level of confidence or tolerance [2, 17, 18].
This threshold, which in a simplified picture is assumed
to have the same value ω across the entire population,
quantifies how susceptible an individual is to possible
cultural influences. According to this picture, two indi-
viduals can only influence each other if they are socially
tied and also sufficiently similar culturally: the effective
medium of interaction is the overlap between the social
network and the cultural graph connecting pairs of simi-
lar individuals (see Appendix for an extended discussion).
Rather than conveying a detailed picture of reality, mod-
els of social dynamics aim at understanding the effects
that different mechanisms proposed in social science may
have when combined together and when taking place at
a large-scale level. In particular, the importance of one
of the most popular models, proposed by Axelrod [15],
resides in showing that social influence and homophily do
not necessarily reinforce each other and determine a cul-
turally homogeneous society. In fact, the model suggests
that the persistence of cultural diversity in the long term
is warranted by the inhibition of influence among dissim-
ilar individuals, even if socially tied. However, if plugged
into other models of social dynamics [2, 9, 11], the same
mechanism prevents information diffusion across cultur-
ally disconnected groups, and therefore also implies no
collective social behavior in the short term. We will give
an explicit example of this effect simulating both short-
and long-term dynamics on random data.
According to the above results, the coexistence of long-
term cultural diversity and short-term collective behav-
ior is apparently a paradox, which can only be solved
by invoking different mechanisms at different timescales.
However, here we show that, even without postulat-
ing more complicated scenarios, the paradox can be ex-
plained by taking into account an insofar ignored aspect
of empirical multidimensional cultural profiles.
II. THE HIERARCHICAL DISTRIBUTION OF
INDIVIDUALS IN CULTURAL SPACE
Our study starts with the analysis of the large Eu-
robarometer dataset[19, 20], an official report of a
questionnaire-based survey[21, 22] of the European Com-
mission, which allowed us to reconstruct the empirical
multidimensional vectors of 13,000 individuals across 12
European countries. In the Appendix we describe the
dataset in more detail, and how the multiple-choice na-
ture of the questionnaire allowed us to define, for each in-
dividual i in country α, an F -dimesional vector ~vi whose
kth component v
(k)
i represents the answer given by i to
question k in the survey (k = 1, . . . F , where the num-
ber of questions is F = 161). To obtain groups of equal
size, we sampled N = 500 individuals for each of the 12
countries, plus a thirteenth group of N = 500 individ-
uals sampled all across Europe. We labeled each group
with a Greek letter α = 1, . . . 13. For each pair i, j of
individuals we defined a normalized metric distance d
(k)
ij
(0 ≤ d(k)ij ≤ 1) between v(k)i and v(k)j , measuring how dif-
ferent the answers given by i and j to question k were.
We also defined an overall metric distance dij (again such
that 0 ≤ dij ≤ 1) between the entire sets of answers ~vi
and ~vj given by i and j (see Appendix for all definitions).
In addition to real data, we considered two types of
randomized data which represent important null models
providing informative benchmarks throughout our anal-
ysis. A first type of randomization (‘random answers’)
simply consists in defining N random vectors, each ob-
tained drawing F answers uniformly among the possible
alternatives. This simulates N individuals giving com-
pletely random answers to the questionnaire, and does
not depend on the empirically observed answers. This
provides a unique random benchmark against which all
sampled groups can be compared, and corresponds to the
usual initial specification in the Axelrod model [15] and
similar models [2, 17, 18]. A second type of randomiza-
tion (‘shuffled answers’) consists in randomly shuffling,
for each of the F questions in the questionnaire, the real
answers given by the N individuals of the group consid-
ered. In this case, different groups have different random-
ized benchmarks, each characterized by its own probabil-
ity distribution (determined by real data) of possible an-
swers. This null model is very important, as it preserves
the number of times a particular answer was actually
given to each question (so it preserves ‘more fashioned’
answers for each group), but destroys the correlations be-
tween answers given by the same individual to different
questions. [27]
We analyzed several properties of real and randomized
data, as a preliminary step before studying the impact
of the empirical structure on short- and long-term dy-
namics. A peculiar aspect of our multidimensional data
is the possibility to investigate cross-correlations among
opinions, an information which is not available in one-
dimensional studies. In particular, we studied whether
small (large) differences between the answers given to
question k imply small (large) differences between an-
swers to question l by measuring the correlation ρ
(kl)
α be-
tween d
(k)
ij and d
(l)
ij for all pairs k, l of questions and for
all pairs i, j ∈ α of individuals belonging to group α (see
Appendix). We found that, whereas random and shuf-
fled data display no significant correlation by construc-
tion, real data are always characterized by a predomi-
nance of strong positive correlations, plus a minority of
weak negative correlations. This pattern is analogous to
the ‘likes attract’ phenomenon: individuals with more be-
liefs in common are more likely to agree on other opinions
(strong positive correlation), while dissimilar individuals
tend to ignore, rather than repel, each other (weak neg-
ative correlation). However, in this case we have an evi-
dence of a deeper mechanism, since we know that individ-
3α Country µα,real µα,shuffled σα,real σα,shuffled
1 Belgium 0.299 0.299 0.052 0.024
2 Denmark 0.307 0.307 0.054 0.025
3 France 0.303 0.303 0.050 0.025
4 Germany 0.295 0.295 0.054 0.024
5 Greece 0.286 0.286 0.059 0.024
6 Ireland 0.295 0.295 0.057 0.024
7 Italy 0.295 0.295 0.052 0.024
8 Luxembourg 0.304 0.304 0.051 0.024
9 Netherlands 0.297 0.297 0.051 0.025
10 Portugal 0.287 0.287 0.067 0.024
11 Spain 0.298 0.298 0.058 0.024
12 UK 0.292 0.292 0.053 0.024
13 Europe 0.304 0.304 0.053 0.025
14 Random 0.445 0.445 0.027 0.027
TABLE I: Average (µα) and standard deviation (σα), for real
and shuffled data, of inter-vector distances for the 12 groups
sampled from European countries (α = 1, 12; alphabetical
order) plus the group sampled across Europe (α = 13) and
the set of uniformly random data (α = 14).
uals in our data are socially unrelated. Therefore, rather
than an effect of homophily and social influence, the ob-
served result is the signature of intrinsic inter-opinion
correlations in a single individual.
The observed inter-opinion correlations have impor-
tant effects on the distribution of individuals, i.e. of the
vectors {~vi}, in cultural space. We find (see Table I)
that the average inter-individual distance µα ≡ 〈dij〉ij∈α
of random data is larger than real data, while it is easy to
show theoretically (and confirm by looking at the mea-
sured values) that real and shuffled data always have the
same value of µα, i.e. µα,real = µα,shuffled. This means
that the observed ‘attraction’ among opinions does not
imply, as one would naively expect, that the empirical
vectors {~vi} are closer to each other in cultural space
than shuffled data. However, real and shuffled data dif-
fer significantly in other properties of the distribution
of vectors in cultural space. A first difference is that
real distances are much more broadly distributed than
shuffled ones. This can be inspected by measuring the
intra-group variance σ2α ≡ 〈d2ij〉ij∈α − 〈dij〉2ij∈α. As can
be seen from Table I, σα,real is roughly twice as large
as, and more variable than, σα,shuffled (see Appendix
for more details). Further important higher-order differ-
ences between real and randomized data can be charac-
terized by performing a hierarchical clustering algorithm
of the vectors {~vi}, which represents the latter as leaves of
a dendrogram where culturally closer individuals have a
lower common branching point. This is shown in fig.1 for
real, shuffled, and random data. As one can clearly see,
the dendrogram for real data is well structured in sub-
branches nested within branches, indicating that cultural
space is heterogeneously populated by dense communi-
ties of similar individuals, separated by sparsely occupied
regions. The hierarchical character of this distribution
shows that denser regions are iteratively fragmented into
aL Real
bL Shuffled cL Random
FIG. 1: Dendrograms resulting from the application of an
average linkage clustering algorithm to the cultural vectors
{~vi}, represented as leaves of the tree along the horizontal
axis. a) Real Germany data. b) Shuffled Germany data. c)
Random data.
denser regions nested within them. This peculiar organi-
zation indicates that the original distances are (nearly)
ultrametric [23], i.e. the tree-like representation rendered
by the dendrogram is not just an artifact of the clus-
tering algorithm, but a natural property of the data.
This means that the height of the first branching point
connecting two individuals i and j approximately corre-
sponds to the original distance dij between ~vi and ~vj . By
contrast, the dendrograms for shuffled and real data are
trivially structured, with no well-defined internal separa-
tion between different hierarchical levels. In this case the
dendrogram is not representative of the original distribu-
tion of vectors, and is merely an uninformative outcome
of the algorithm which is forcing non-ultrametric data
into a tree-like description. In such a situation, the verti-
cal dimension of the dendrogram loses it correspondence
with the original inter-vector distances, and provides a
highly distorted image of the latter. Thus, we find that
the broader distribution of real distances (with respect
to shuffled ones) is implied by the ultrametric structure,
characterized on one hand by an increased frequency of
both nearby vectors (representing individuals within the
same branch of the dendrogram), and on the other hand
by an increased frequency of distant ones (representing
individuals belonging to different branches). By contrast,
shuffled data generate vectors with the same average dis-
tance but more uniformly and non-ultrametrically dis-
tributed in cultural space.
4III. LOCAL AND GLOBAL LEVELS OF
INFLUENCE
The ultrametric hierarchy discussed above has impor-
tant static and dynamic consequences. As we show in the
Appendix, the branches of the dendrogram ‘cut’ horizon-
tally at a distance ω coincide with the connected compo-
nents of the ω-dependent cultural graph we defined in the
beginning. It is interesting to study, as a function of ω,
the density of links fα(ω) (which is nothing but the CDF
of the distance distribution) and the size fraction sα(ω)
of the largest connected component in the cultural graph,
which represent a local and a global measure of influence
among the individuals of group α respectively. The re-
sulting curves are shown in fig.2a-b. For both quantities,
we observe large differences between real and random-
ized data. In particular we find that, for a given value
of α, real data are characterized by higher levels of local
and global influence than shuffled and random data. In
order to understand whether the differences among the
curves in figs.2a and 2b can be simply traced back to
overall differences in the average values (µα) and vari-
ances (σ2α) of the inter-vector distances, in fig.2c-d we
show fα and sα when plotted as a function of the stan-
dardized parameter z ≡ (ω−µα)/σα. We find (see fig.2c)
that all the fα(z) plots collapse onto a single univer-
sal curve, which is indistinguishable from the cumulative
density function (CDF) of the standard Gaussian distri-
bution f0(z) ≡
∫ z
−∞
dx(e−x
2/2)/
√
2π. In other words, in
each group α the distances are normally distributed, with
group-specific mean µα and variance σ
2
α. This means that
all the empirical differences in link density among groups
are taken care of after rescaling the distance, so that the
control parameter z completely specifies the density of
realized cultural channels of any group. Thus, if cultural
channels were placed uniformly among individuals as in
a homogeneous random graph, one would also observe
an analogous universal collapse of the sα(z) curves and
of any other topological property. By contrast, as can
be seen in fig.2d, this approximately occurs only in the
shuffled case, but not for real data. This result indicates
again a nontrivial distribution of real cultural vectors,
and singles out differences across the sampled groups that
are not simply explained in terms of an overall variability.
In particular, the universality of the link density function
observed in fig.2c does not imply a universal structure of
connected components, due to correlations between pairs
of edges generated by the correlations between distances.
In other words, even after standardizing the local level of
mutual influence, real data continue to differ significantly
in their global level of influence. Therefore any process
which depends on the cultural distance between individ-
uals might have very different global outcomes even when
taking place on locally identical structures.
All the above results show that even randomly sam-
pled individuals (as the ones in our database) are not
characterized by uniformly random cultural vectors. [28]
While this is not surprising, the peculiar hierarchical dis-
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FIG. 2: Local and global measures of influence in cultural
graphs obtained from real and randomized data. a) Fraction
of direct influential interactions (link density) fα as a func-
tion of the threshold ω. b) Fraction of the largest connected
component sα emerging from indirect influential interactions
as a function of ω. c) Link density fα as a function of the
rescaled threshold z ≡ (ω−µα)/σα. The black solid line is the
cumulative density function (CDF) of the standard Gaussian
distribution. d) Fraction of the largest connected component
sα as a function of the rescaled threshold z.
tribution implied by empirical inter-opinion correlations
is highly nontrivial, and unpredictable a priori. Since,
as we show in what follows, the dynamics of opinions
and culture is strongly dependent on initial conditions,
it is important to investigate how the predictions of pop-
ular models change when the empirically observed data
are considered as the starting configuration, rather than
the ordinarily postulated [2, 15, 17, 18] random (or even
only uncorrelated) cultural vectors. To this end, in what
follows we study how the empirically observed ultramet-
ric structure affects the predictions of models simulating
both short-term and long-term dynamics, with a partic-
ular interest in exploring the effects on the coexistence
of cultural heterogeneity and collective social phenom-
ena. Rather than considering one or more (unavoidably
arbitrary) specifications of possible social networks that
ideally start connecting the (initially non-interacting) in-
dividuals of a group, we choose to establish a unique up-
per bound for the achievable level of influence, where the
social network is virtually replaced by a complete graph.
This choice corresponds to selecting the maximum level
of influence on the social side of the problem, and let-
ting the value of the cultural threshold ω uniquely deter-
mine whether two individuals can influence each other
(dij < ω) or not (dij > ω) according to the bounded con-
fidence hypothesis. As discussed in the Appendix, the
new possibilities of interactions that have been recently
become available on online platforms, where individuals
influence each other bypassing social ties, are modifying
the traditional scenario and leading us closer to this ex-
treme ‘complete graph’ setting. In any case, rather than
the dynamical outcome in absolute terms (which strongly
depends on the specification of the underlying network),
our main interest is the comparison, on the same network,
5of the outcome implied by real cultural vectors with that
implied by randomized data.
IV. SHORT-TERM COLLECTIVE SOCIAL
BEHAVIOR
We first study the effects of the empirical structure
of real opinions on short-term collective social behavior.
We consider a simple prototypic model where, on short
timescales, cultural vectors do not evolve but nonetheless
determine the choices that individuals make under the
influence of each other. To this end, we extend the Cont-
Bouchaud (CB) model [9], originally proposed to model
herding effects in financial markets, to a more general
‘coordination model’ which incorporates a dependence
on real cultural vectors {~vi} (see Appendix). For each
group in our analysis, we consider a situation where in-
dividuals are asked, for instance in democratic elections,
public referenda, financial markets, online surveys, etc.,
to make a binary choice such as yes/no, buy/sell, ap-
prove/reject, left/right etc. We can represent the choice
expressed by the i-th individual as φi = ±1. The effects
of mutual influence and bounded confidence are modeled
by allowing pairs of individuals whose cultural distance
dij is smaller than a threshold ω (which is the only pa-
rameter of the model) to exchange information before
making their choices. As a result of this information ex-
change, we assume that all the agents belonging to the
same connected component of the resulting ω-dependent
cultural graph (see Appendix) collectively agree on the
choice to make. If A labels a connected component of the
graph, the choice of all agents belonging to A is the same
(φi = φA ∀i ∈ A), while different connected components
make statistically independent choices.
The overall outcome of the process (e.g. the result of
the survey/referendum/election) is the sum of individual
preferences, and can be quantified by the average choice
Φ =
1
N
N∑
i=1
φi =
1
N
∑
A
SAφA (1)
where the second sum runs over all connected compo-
nents, and SA is the size of component A. The sign of
Φ reflects the choice of the majority, and a key property
characterizing the outcome of the model is the proba-
bility Pω(Φ) that the average choice takes the particu-
lar value Φ, for a given value of ω. Following the pro-
cedure described in Appendix, we computed Pω(Φ) for
various values of ω (from ω = 0 to ω = 1 in increments
of 0.01) and for all the 13 groups in our dataset (both real
and shuffled), plus the completely random set. In fig.3a
we report the results for real Germany data. As can be
seen, there exists a critical value ωc (in the case shown,
ωc = 0.14±0.01) such that, for ω < ωc, Pω(Φ) is symmet-
ric about zero (as for ω = 0) and, for ω > ωc, Pω(Φ) has
two symmetric peaks. Right at ω = ωc, Pω(Φ) displays
a flattened region. This behavior is typical of symmetry-
breaking phase transitions. Here the order parameter of
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FIG. 3: At a critical confidence level, a spontaneous break-
ing of choice symmetry occurs. a) When our ‘coordination
model’ is simulated on real data (in the example shown, the
Germany group), we observe an abrupt change in the proba-
bility Pω(Φ) of a collective consensus at a critical confidence
value ωc. For ω < ωc, individual choices are uncorrelated and
sum up to a vanishing global outcome Φ = 0, at which Pω(Φ)
has a single peak. For ω > ωc, local interactions result in
global correlations that spread across the entire system, and
a macroscopically coordinated output, whose probability is
peaked about the two nonzero values Φ±(ω), emerges. Right
at ω = ωc, Pω(Φ) displays a flat region typical of critical
phenomena. b) The most probable value of Φ is the order
parameter of the phase transition. For ω < ωc it is vanishing,
while for ω > ωc it branches into the two symmetric values
Φ±(ω). In addition to the results for real Germany data, here
we also show the results for shuffled and random data. Real
data always have a lower critical threshold than randomized
data, indicating an enhanced possibility to behave collectively.
All the other groups show the same behavior.
the transition is the most probable value(s) Φ± of Φ: for
ω < ωc one has Φ+(ω) = Φ−(ω) = 0, while for ω > ωc
one has two symmetric values Φ−(ω) < 0 < Φ+(ω) with
Φ−(ω) = −Φ+(ω). This is shown in fig.3b, where we also
plot the behavior for shuffled and random data. [29]
This analysis allows to measure the critical thresholds
ωc for all the groups we considered (see fig.4). Note that
smaller (larger) values of ωc require smaller (larger) levels
of influence between individuals in order to trigger collec-
tive behavior. Therefore ωc represents a novel measure
of the resistance of a social group to act collectively. Im-
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FIG. 4: Critical thresholds representing resistance to collec-
tive behavior of the sampled groups, for real, shuffled and
random data. For real data, the values of ωc are not consis-
tent with each other within the error bars, indicating different
resistances to coordination across the sampled groups. They
are however always smaller than randomized data, indicating
that the empirical ultrametric distribution in cultural space
systematically facilitates the onset of collective behavior.
portantly, we found that the thresholds for shuffled data
are always larger than those for real data (see fig.4), and
the ones for random data are even larger. This shows
that empirical inter-opinion correlations, which are re-
sponsible for the ultrametric distribution of individuals in
cultural space, strongly facilitate collective social behav-
ior by systematically lowering the resistance to coordina-
tion. While for shuffled and random data all thresholds
are equal within errors, the entity of the enhancement of
collective behavior in real data varies significantly across
the sampled groups and determines non-universal values
of the thresholds. In general, ωc also represents a fun-
damental threshold for any dynamical process dependent
on cultural data. Any mechanism taking place within a
cultural distance smaller than ωc will not propagate to
the whole network, while if the interaction range is larger
than ωc the information can percolate the entire system.
This simple model indicates that, depending on the
local interaction range, individual differences can either
be ‘averaged out’ and disappear at the macroscopic level
or give rise to a collectively coordinated behaviour. Un-
derstanding this transition in real societies is one of the
fundamental open questions of modern social science [1].
In economics, this problem is related to whether it is le-
gitimate to use the concept of ‘representative agent’ as
an idealized individual that makes the average choice of
the society. Contributions from different scientific com-
munities to this ongoing debate gave very different points
of view about the subject. Our simplified model, when
simulated on real data, suggests that both regimes are
possible, and that a simple local parameter can trigger
very different global outcomes. In particular, the vari-
ance of the collective outcome, which grows with the
separation between the peaks of Pω(Φ), can either de-
cay to zero or be amplified macroscopically. In the latter
case, the final outcome is collective (or, in the case of
votes, democratic) in a ‘strong’ sense: a large portion of
the population makes a coordinated action, and the ma-
jority’s choice reflects a truly collective consensus. By
contrast, in the former case the result is collective or
democratic in a ‘weak’ sense: there are several groups of
people making different choices, and the majority’s ac-
tion does not reflect a collective agreement, but rather a
statistical fluctuation about a 50%-50% tie [12]. These
considerations indicate that a good measure of the level
of collective behavior achievable for a given value of ω
is the width of Pω(Φ). Thus we can define the standard
deviation
C(ω) ≡ σω(Φ) =
√√√√∑
A
(
SA
N
)2
ω
(2)
as a measure of short-term social coordination. The lat-
ter equality in the above formula (see Appendix for a
rigorous proof) states that, intriguingly, C(ω) is uniquely
determined by the sizes {SA} of the connected compo-
nents of the underlying cultural graph obtained for that
particular value of ω, and is therefore actually indepen-
dent of the dynamical model considered. This quantity
will be useful in what follows. Note that C(ω) ranges
between 0 and 1. If ω = 0 (no coordination), its value is
C(ω) ≃ 1/
√
N (as follows from the Central Limit Theo-
rem) and vanishes for large N . At the opposite extreme,
if ω = 1 (complete coordination) then C(ω) = 1 which is
as large as the standard deviation of the individual choice
φi, and remains finite when N →∞.
V. LONG-TERM CULTURAL DIVERSITY
We now take an evolutionary perspective and focus on
a longer temporal scale over which the cultural vectors
themselves can change. In this case we use a modified
version [17] of the popular Axelrod model [15], which is
designed to simulate the evolution of vectors of cultural
traits on social networks, again in a way that real data
can enter into the model.[30] A detailed discussion of the
model can be found in the Appendix. In an elementary
time-step, two individuals i and j belonging to the same
sampled group are randomly selected. If the generalized
overlap oij ≡ 1− dij (where dij is the above-defined dis-
tance between the vectors ~vi and ~vj) is smaller than or
equal to θ, no interaction takes place. Otherwise, with
probability equal to oij , the two individuals interact: a
component v
(k)
j , chosen randomly among the components
where ~vi and ~vj differ, is changed and set equal to i’s cor-
responding component: v
(k)
j = v
(k)
i . Otherwise nothing
happens, and two other individuals are selected. These
rules implement the two basic mechanisms of social influ-
ence (interacting actors tend to converge culturally) and
homophily (similar individuals interact more frequently).
Note that, in line with our previous analysis, we are as-
suming that every pair of individuals can interact, i.e.
7the underlying social network is a complete graph. In
the allowed final configurations, any two cultural vectors
are either completely identical or separated by a distance
larger than ω ≡ 1−θ, and the average 〈ND〉ω (over many
realizations) of the number ND of distinct vectors in the
final stage, or equivalently the fraction
D(ω) ≡ 〈ND〉ω
N
(3)
is a convenient way to measure the long-term cultural
diversity as a function of ω.
We ran several realizations of the model by taking both
real and randomized cultural vectors {~vi} as the starting
configuration. As we show in the Appendix, we find that
real data are those that achieve the largest level of long-
term cultural heterogeneity (value of 〈ND〉). Indeed, for
real data the realized value of 〈ND〉 is the largest possi-
ble (〈ND〉 ≈ NC) indicating that cultural convergence is
confined within the initial connected components, each of
which eventually becomes a single cultural domain. By
contrast, in randomized data there are less final cultural
domains than initial connected components, indicating
that the latter often ‘merge’ into larger cultural domains.
The reason for the remarkably different behavior of real
and randomized data is, once again, the ultrametric char-
acter of the former. As we show in fig.5, ultrametricity
implies that the branches obtained cutting the real-data
dendrogram at some value of ω will collapse into a sin-
gle cultural vector. This means that the initial structure
of the dendrogram above ω will be ‘frozen’ and unaf-
fected by cultural evolution. This confines cultural con-
vergence locally within the lower branches. By contrast,
in randomized data the lack of ultrametricity implies that
branches are not well separated, so that the local conver-
gence of vectors within a branch reduce the separation
of the branch itself from nearby branches. Thus in this
case branches are unstable, and often merge modifying
the entire structure globally.
We can combine the above findings with our previous
results about collective behavior. In particular, given a
group of individuals, we can measure both the short-term
social coordination C(ω) defined in eq.(2) and the long-
term cultural diversity D(ω) defined in eq.(3) for various
values of ω. Then we can plot D(ω) versus the value
C(ω) obtained for the same ω, as in fig.6. If we look at
random data, we retrieve the naive result that the co-
existence of cultural heterogeneity and social collective
behavior is impossible, since we have either D ≈ 0 or
C ≈ 0. Note that a cultural graph defined among random
vectors is approximately equivalent to a random graph,
whose density is completely determined by ω through the
relation shown in fig.2a. Therefore the results we show for
random vectors coincide with the standard results that
would be obtained by simulating the Cont-Bouchaud and
Axelrod models on random graphs, for various density
values. By contrast, we find that real cultural vectors al-
low high simultaneous levels of short-term coordination
and long-term diversity, including the approximately bal-
aL Initial HrealL bL Final HsimulatedL
cL Initial HrealL dL Final HsimulatedL
FIG. 5: The hierarchical structure implied by inter-opinion
correlations constrains cultural evolution. a) The real, hier-
archically organized cultural vectors for the Germany group
(the same as shown in fig.1a) are considered as the initial
state of the modified Axelrod model, and a confidence level
(corresponding to the horizontal line below which the shaded
region originates) is imposed. b) Due to ultrametricity, in
the corresponding final state of the model all the individuals
within a common shaded branch in the initial dendrogram
collapse to the same cultural vector, with negligible effects on
the upper part of the dendrogram. c) The same initial state
as above is considered, but a lower confidence level is imposed.
d) Correspondingly, the final state of the model consists of
a larger number of distinct cultural vectors, each containing
on average less individuals with collapsed vectors. Thus the
number of distinct final vectors (the leaves of the final den-
drogram) coincides with the number of branches intersecting
the horizontal line in the initial dendrogram. If shuffled or
random opinions are taken as the initial state of the model
(not shown), this is no longer true since the convergence of
cultural vectors also affects the dendrogram’s structure above
the horizontal line, signalling a lack of ultrametricity.
anced regime C ≈ D ≈ 1/2 which in the case shown is
achieved for the moderate influence level ω ≈ 0.17. Shuf-
fled data follow an intermediate curve, showing that the
heterogeneous frequencies of real opinions and the cor-
relations among the latter both play a significant role
in enhancing the coexistence of diversity and coordina-
tion. Thus, surprisingly, we find that empirical hierarchi-
cal correlations simultaneously enhance collective behav-
ior and sustain cultural heterogeneity. While the incom-
patibility of these two phenomena holds for randomized
data, which represent the usual specification of dynami-
cal models, it is violated by real data. This remarkable
result highlights the scarce predictive power of models
that consider random specifications, and shows the im-
portance of empirical analyses of high-dimensional cul-
tural vectors, which offer the unprecedented possibility
to explore cross-correlations among opinions and their
consequences.
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FIG. 6: Phase diagram summarizing our results. The long-
term cultural diversity D is shown as a function of short-term
social coordination C for real, shuffled and random data. If
random cultural vectors are considered, cultural heterogeneity
and collective behavior are mutually excluding: one has either
D ≈ 0 or C ≈ 0. This approximately corresponds to the tra-
ditional situation explored when considering a random graph
of interaction among individuals. By contrast, real cultural
vectors allow high simultaneous levels of short-term coordi-
nation and long-term diversity, including the approximately
balanced regime C ≈ D ≈ 1/2. Shuffled data follow an inter-
mediate curve, showing that the heterogeneous frequencies of
real opinions and the correlations among the latter both play
a significant role in enhancing the coexistence of diversity and
coordination in the real world.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
By using a large detailed dataset, we have character-
ized the empirical properties of the large-scale distribu-
tion of individuals in multidimensional cultural space.
We found that real inter-opinion correlations organize
individuals hierarchically and ultrametrically in cultural
space, a result which is not retrieved when randomized or
one-dimensional opinions are considered. These proper-
ties strongly determine the exploitable network of inter-
actions that is expected to arise as a result of the bounded
confidence hypothesis, according to which individuals are
only influenced by culturally similar peers. Ultrametric-
ity has profound and nontrivial consequences on short-
and long-term cultural dynamics. In the short term, if
one assumes that consensus can be reached by individuals
with sufficiently similar opinions, we found the existence
of a symmetry-breaking phase transition where collec-
tive behavior arises out of purely local interactions. The
critical threshold of this transition is remarkably lower
in real data than in randomized cases, indicating that
ultrametricity enhances short-term collective behavior.
However, in the long term the same ultrametric property
suppresses cultural convergence by restricting it withing
disjoint domains, implying a strong sensitivity to initial
conditions. These opposite effects imply that, whereas
in random data the coexistence of short-term coordina-
tion and long-term diversity is unfeasible, in real data
it is strongly enhanced and can be achieved in a broad
region of parameter space. Thus the apparent paradox
of the coexistence of short-term collective social behavior
and long-term cultural diversity might have, as a simple
and parsimonious explanation, the empirically observed
hierarchical distribution of individuals in cultural space.
Appendix A: Social networks and cultural graphs:
the online shift
Here we discuss how social influence, homophily and
bounded confidence are believed to affect social dynam-
ics, and how offline and online environments are expected
to contribute differently to the process. As we men-
tioned in the main text, the bounded confidence hypoth-
esis states that two individuals are potentially influenced
by each other only if the distance between their cultural
variables (or vectors) is smaller than a certain threshold
ω. Thus, while social influence takes place on a social
network connecting individuals, bounded confidence in-
volves a different graph, that we denote as the cultural
graph, where pairs of individuals separated by a distance
smaller than the confidence ω are connected by ‘cultural
channels’, irrespective of whether they are neighbors in
a social network. When combined together, these hy-
potheses imply that the actual network of interactions is
given by the overlap between social ties and (confidence-
dependent) cultural channels. If sij and cij(ω) denote the
elements of the adjacency matrix of the social and cul-
tural network respectively (equal to 1 if a link between
vertices i and j is there, and 0 otherwise), the overlap
network is described by an adjacency matrix with en-
tries aij(ω) = sijcij(ω), where cij(ω) = 1 if dij < ω and
cij(ω) = 0 if dij > ω.
Models that simulate the evolution of societies must
therefore be complemented by empirical analyses charac-
terizing both social networks and cultural graphs. How-
ever, while a huge literature is devoted to the study of
real networks formed by social ties (using both tradi-
tional small-scale surveys [24] and more recently large-
scale communication data [13, 25]), little is known about
the empirical properties of those formed by cultural chan-
nels. As a consequence, when considering models of opin-
ion dynamics, social networks have been so far considered
as proxies for the actual interaction graphs, i.e. aij ≈ sij ,
which amounts to assume cij ≈ 1 (or equivalently an un-
bounded confidence ω = +∞) for all pairs of individu-
als. This assumption is helpful in the traditional offline
situation where social ties are expected to be dominant
over cultural channels, for instance when social groups
are formed independently of the cultural traits of people
(e.g. acquaintances made in public schools). However,
it prevents our understanding of the opposite extreme,
i.e. when people look for culturally similar peers, that
they do not know initially, to interact with (for instance
by joining an open discussion group on a focused topic
9of interest). In such a situation the empirical knowledge
of cij(ω) may become even more important than that of
sij . While these non-social interactions used to represent
only a secondary means of opinion diffusion up to some
years ago, they are now becoming more and more per-
vasive as novel electronic platforms are being developed
and used at a large scale [3, 6, 7, 14]. Indeed, in recent
years many new possibilities of interaction have rapidly
emerged, such as the exchange of opinions through the
WWW (on-line forums, blogs, discussion groups, etc.)
and other media. In these platforms, people already in-
terested in a topic search new peers (who they may never
meet physically afterwards) to discuss with, experiencing
novel ways by which opinions can interact. These interac-
tions can be even stronger than those occurring through
direct knowledge, as virtual communities gather together
people with oriented and focused interests, who often rec-
ognize each other as the most natural and qualified peers
to share ideas with, even if no direct knowledge exists
between them.
The above picture suggests an extension of the idea of
homophily, according to which ‘likes attract’, to an online
setting. When these additional possibilities of interaction
are considered, cultural channels may become the domi-
nant means of interaction, as people with similar interests
are more likely to access the same platform(s) and ex-
change opinions more frequently than culturally dissimi-
lar individuals. In this opposite extreme, the ‘social’ net-
work through which opinions can in principle interact is
virtually replaced by a complete graph (i.e., sij = 1 ∀i, j)
where everybody is connected to everyone else (in social
space, the interaction becomes infinite-ranged). Cultural
graphs therefore become a natural proxy for the actual
interaction graph: aij(ω) ≈ cij(ω). Despite its increas-
ing importance, our understanding of this novel type of
long-range opinion dynamics, which bypasses social ties
and is dominated by the structure of real opinions and
cultural graphs, is incomplete. Our analysis bridges this
gap by using real data about the opinions, beliefs and
attitudes of thousands of Europeans to produce cultural
graphs where we can investigate the outcome of infinite-
range, online-like dynamics on both short and long time
scales.
Appendix B: Definition of cultural vectors and
distances
Here we describe how we reconstructed real multidi-
mensional opinions from empirical data. We note that,
for our analysis to be insightful, we need to access the
opinions of a set of real individuals who do not know each
other and are well separated socially. This is essential in
order to separate the purely cultural dynamical effects
from ordinary social influence effects (producing conver-
gent cultural traits) that might be already present in the
data if the individuals are sampled nearby in a social net-
work. For this reason, we focused on a large dataset that
is specifically designed to survey a number of beliefs and
opinions across Europe, and based on standard sampling
protocols ensuring that individuals are selected avoiding
the bias due to (among other factors) social closeness.
This dataset [21, 22], an official release of the Eurobarom-
eter project [19, 20], reports (in its 1992 snapshot[31]) the
results of face-to-face interviews where about 13,000 in-
dividuals across 12 European countries[32]) were asked
to fill a questionnaire containing several multiple-choice
questions. These questions were designed to capture a
range of individual beliefs and attitudes towards vari-
ous scientific topics, thus surveying the ‘Public Under-
standing of Science’ across Europe. Besides probing the
general level of scientific awareness in the individuals,
the questionnaire focused on issues that were considered
‘hot topics’ in relation to European integration, e.g. the
introduction of novel biotechnologies, the role of scien-
tists in the dissemination of their research results, various
bioethical questions, etc. The database is invaluable in
order to study the real multidimensional organization of
opinions, as well as its dynamical consequences. In par-
ticular, it allows us to establish a previously unavailable
empirical reference for theoretical models, such as the
aforementioned one proposed by Axelrod, where individ-
uals are represented as vectors of cultural traits evolving
through the interaction with peers.
Raw data, originally arranged in a SPSS spreadsheet
file of N = 13, 000 rows where row i reported the (numer-
ically coded) answers of the i-th individual to F = 161
multiple-choice questions, were transformed into N F -
dimensional vectors {~vi}. Each component v(k)i of these
vectors was given a value such that the corresponding
contribution d
(k)
ij to the overall distance
dij =
1
F
F∑
k=1
d
(k)
ij (B1)
is in the range [0, 1], with d
(k)
ij = 0 representing i and
j giving an identical answer to question k and d
(k)
ij = 1
representing i and j giving opposite answers. For ‘met-
ric’ questions, where answers were possible in an equally
spaced scale of Qk possibilities, the maximum informa-
tion is retained by mapping the original answers to the
possible values
v
(k)
i = 0,
1
Qk − 1 ,
2
Qk − 1 , . . . , 1
and defining d
(k)
ij ≡ |v(k)i − v(k)j |. For non-metric ques-
tions (associated to Qk unordered possible alternatives),
‘opposite answers’ simply means ‘different answers’, and
we therefore mapped the possible values of v
(k)
i to Qk
arbitrary symbols and defined d
(k)
ij ≡ 1 if v(k)i = v(k)j and
d
(k)
ij ≡ 0 otherwise. If all questions were non-metric, this
choice would be equivalent to dij = 1−oij/F where oij is
the overlap (number of components with identical value)
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between ~vi and ~vj , a commonly used notion of cultural
similarity [15] as mentioned in the main text. Note that
for binary answers (such as ‘yes’/‘no’) the metric and
non-metric definitions coincide.
Each individual belongs to one of the 12 European
countries in the dataset. This information allowed us to
generate groups of individuals sampled either from the
same country, or from different ones. We labeled dif-
ferent groups of individuals with different Greek letters
(α, β, . . . ), and use the notation i ∈ α to indicate an indi-
vidual i belonging to group α. In order to deal with sam-
ples of equal size, we selected N = 500 individuals per
country[33] and generated 12 groups accordingly. This
reproduces a situation where, for instance, people with
the same language join a medium-sized online discussion
group mediating electronic, non-social interactions men-
tioned above. Similarly, it mimics individuals that are
physically ‘put together’ to participate to a discussion
group or to a social experiment. Finally, this choice al-
lows to establish an upper bound for the cultural ho-
mogeneity predicted by the ‘traditional’ dynamics tak-
ing place on any possible social network connecting the
same individuals. We also generated an additional thir-
teenth group with N = 500 individuals sampled from all
the 12 European countries, and denoted it as the Europe
group. This reproduces a situation analogous to the one
described above, but where several individuals across Eu-
rope can form a group irrespective of their nationalities,
e.g. using a common language such as English.
Appendix C: Measuring inter-opinion correlations
Our multidimensional data allowed us to investigate
cross-correlations among opinions, an information which
is not available in one-dimensional studies. We measured
the covariance matrix between d
(k)
ij /F and d
(l)
ij /F , whose
entries read
σ(k,l)α ≡
〈d(k)ij d(l)ij 〉ij∈α − 〈d(k)ij 〉ij∈α〈d(l)ij 〉ij∈α
F 2
(C1)
where 〈·〉ij∈α denotes an average over all pairs of individ-
uals in group α. From the above matrix it is possible to
obtain the inter-opinion correlation matrix, whose entries
read
ρ(k,l)α ≡
σ
(k,l)
α
σ
(k,k)
α σ
(l,l)
α
(C2)
and range between −1 (perfect anticorrelation) and 1
(perfect correlation). A colour plot of the correlation
matrix is shown in fig.7a for the group sampled from Ger-
many data, which will remain a reference case through-
out our analysis (similar results are found for all the other
sampled groups). As can be seen, there are several pairs
of opinions (k, l) characterized by strong positive cor-
relations (ρ
(k,l)
α ≈ 1), but only a few pairs with weak
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FIG. 7: Colour plots of Inter-opinion correlation matrices
ρ
(k,l)
α for the Germany group. a) real data. b) shuffled data.
negative correlations (ρ
(k,l)
α . 0). The predominance of
positive correlations indicates that, in general, two indi-
viduals i and j giving similar/different answers to ques-
tion k (small/large d
(k)
ij ) tend to give similar/different
answers to question l as well (small/large d
(l)
ij ), while the
opposite outcome (small d
(k)
ij and large d
(l)
ij ) occurs much
less frequently. As we show in fig.7b, the inter-opinion
correlation matrix for shuffled data lacks any structure,
indicating the absence of statistically significant correla-
tions (obviously, the same is true for random data, not
shown).
The elements of the covariance matrix determine the
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intra-group variance
σ2α ≡ 〈d2ij〉ij∈α − 〈dij〉2ij∈α =
∑
k,l
σ(k,l)α (C3)
Note that for shuffled data we have
σ2α,shuffled =
∑
k
σ
(k,k)
α,shuffled =
∑
k
σ
(k,k)
α,real (C4)
since σ
(k,k)
α,shuffled = σ
(k,k)
α,real and σ
(k,l)
α,shuffled = 0 for k 6= l,
while for real data we have
σ2α,real = σ
2
α,shuffled +
∑
k 6=l
σ
(k,l)
α,real > σ
2
α,shuffled (C5)
where the last inequality comes from the observed posi-
tivity of
∑
k 6=l σ
(k,l)
α,real. Therefore, even if the distribution
of inter-vector distances has the same average value in
real and shuffled data, real distances are more broadly
distributed than shuffled ones.
Appendix D: Link density and largest connected
components
The ultrametricity of real inter-vector distances implies
that if we ‘cut’ the dendrogram of cultural vectors at
some height ω we obtain a set of disconnected branches,
within which individuals are separated by a cultural dis-
tance smaller than ω, and across which individuals are
separated by a distance larger than ω. In other words, we
obtain the connected components of the cultural graph
defined by linking pairs of individuals separated by a dis-
tance lower than a certain threshold ω. The concept
of bounded confidence implies that individuals belonging
to different connected components of the cultural graph,
even if linked by a social tie, cannot interact. Therefore
in a fragmented cultural graph information (intended as
mutual influence) can only diffuse locally. A necessary
condition in order to have a global spread of information
is that cultural channels form a giant connected compo-
nent spanning (a finite fraction of) the N individuals in
a given group. The fraction sα(ω) of vertices spanned
by the largest connected component for a given value of
ω represents an upper bound for the fraction of individ-
uals in group α that can mutually influence each other,
through either direct or indirect interactions, if the con-
fidence threshold is set to ω. Therefore sα(ω) is a global
measure of potential influence, capturing how local inter-
actions combine together at a large-scale level. It is also
important to consider a purely local measure of influence,
i.e. the average probability that any two individuals can
influence each other through a direct interaction. To this
end, we also measure the density fα(ω) of realized cul-
tural channels, i.e. the fraction of pairs of individuals in
group α closer than ω. Note that fα(ω) is simply the
cumulative density function (CDF) of the distance dis-
tribution, i.e. it counts how many pairs of individuals
are at distance smaller than ω. For ultrametric data, it
also coincides with the fraction of pairs of cultural vectors
within the same connected branches, when the dendro-
gram is cut at the height ω as discussed above. By con-
trast, for randomized data both fα(ω) and sα(ω) are no
longer in relation with the structure of the dendrogram
‘cut’ at a given point in the vertical dimension, since the
latter does not represent the original distances, due to
the lack of ultrametricity.
Appendix E: The modified Cont-Bouchaud model
In its simplest formulation, the Cont-Bouchaud (CB)
model [9] considers a population of individuals (in the
financial jargon, agents) that can make a binary choice
between buying or selling an asset traded in the market.
We can represent the choice expressed by the i-th agent
as φi = ±1. Binary choices are the simplest possibil-
ity considered also in other models of social processes,
such as voting dynamics [2]. In the CB model, the ef-
fects of mutual influence are modeled by introducing a
random graph through which agents can exchange in-
formation before making their choices. As a result of
this information exchange, all the agents belonging to
the same connected component are assumed to collec-
tively agree on the choice to make. Therefore, if A labels
a connected component of the graph, the choice of all
agents belonging to A is the same (φi = φA ∀i ∈ A),
while different connected components make statistically
independent choices. The key result is that the probabil-
ity distribution of the aggregate choice of all individuals
(which in the CB model is the aggregate demand deter-
mining the price change of the asset) crucially depends
on the topology of the interaction graph. In particular,
if the connection probability p is set at the critical value
pc ∼ N−1 (for N → ∞) of the phase transition giving
rise to the giant connected component, the distribution
of the sizes of connected components acquires a power-
law form, which in turn implies a power-law distribution
of price returns similar to the empirically observed ones.
Other values of p yield different outcomes. In the limit
p = 0 (empty graph) all agents make independent choices
and the distribution becomes Gaussian. By contrast, for
p = 1 (complete graph) all agents always make the same
choice and the distribution is double-peaked.
In order to study the effects of the nontrivial distribu-
tion of individuals in cultural space, we extended the CB
model to a more general ‘coordination model’ which in-
corporates a dependence on real data. In particular, we
introduce a more realistic mechanism allowing culturally
similar agents to express similar preferences. To take
this aspect into account we assume that each agent is de-
scribed by a cultural vector {~vi} and that agents interact,
rather than on a random graph defined by a value of p,
on the cultural graph defined by a value of the confidence
ω. Again, agents within the same connected component
are assumed to make collectively the same choice, while
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agents belonging to different components express statis-
tically independent preferences.
The overall outcome of the process (e.g. the result of
the survey/referendum/election) is the sum of individual
preferences, and can be quantified by the average choice
Φ =
1
N
N∑
i=1
φi (E1)
whose sign reflects the choice of the majority. If the
choices of all agents are independent (ω = 0), Φ is the
sum of N uncorrelated random variables with finite vari-
ance and, as follows from the Central Limit Theorem,
normally distributed. In such a case, if the individual bi-
nary probabilities are equal (i.e. the events φi = +1 and
φi = −1 are equiprobable), then the probability Pω(Φ)
that the average choice takes the particular value Φ is
symmetric about the most probable value Φ = 0. If
ω > 0, Φ can be rewritten as the sum over different con-
nected components:
Φ =
1
N
∑
A
SAφA (E2)
where now A labels the components, φA = ±1 is the
choice of all actors in component A, and SA is the size
of A. Now, a crucial point is that even if each connected
component makes one of the two choices φA = ±1 with
equal probability, and hence the distribution Pω(Φ) is
still symmetric about Φ = 0, the symmetry breaks spon-
taneously at the critical threshold ωc. To see this, one
can compute Pω(Φ) in the following manner. For each
group of individuals in our data, and for a given value
of ω (from ω = 0 to ω = 1 in increments of 0.01), we
identify the connected components, assign one of the two
choices randomly to each of them, and compute the re-
sulting value of Φ. We repeat this procedure 500,000
times on each sampled group and measure Pω(Φ) as the
normalized histogram of the values obtained. The above
analysis provides a method to determine with small in-
determinacy (∆ω = 0.01) the threshold value ωc for each
particular, finite group under study. We repeated our
analysis on each of the 13 sampled groups (real and ran-
domized) and obtained the corresponding critical thresh-
olds ωc ±∆ω.
We found that, while the critical thresholds obtained
for shuffled data (and, trivially, also random ones) are
consistent with each other, real data feature different crit-
ical values. This implies that even two randomly sampled
social groups (for instance one in Italy and one in Por-
tugal) with the same size and under the same level of
mutual influence may evolve to opposite collective states
(coordination or heterogeneity) if the critical thresholds
for the two groups differ.
We now prove rigorously the equality
C(ω) ≡ σω(Φ) =
√√√√∑
A
(
SA
N
)2
ω
(E3)
which establishes a tight relation between network topol-
ogy and the level of collective social behavior in the
model. If, for a given value of ω, we denote the expected
value of Φ as 〈Φ〉ω =
∑
Φ Pω(Φ)Φ and its second moment
as 〈Φ2〉ω =
∑
Φ Pω(Φ)Φ
2, the variance σ2ω(Φ) is defined
as
σ2ω(Φ) ≡ 〈Φ2〉ω − 〈Φ〉2ω (E4)
For simplicity, in what follows we drop the dependence of
all quantities on ω. For a fixed value of ω, the sizes of the
connected components of the network are given by {SA},
and determine the aggregate choice Φ through eq.(E2).
Since Φ is a sum of the random variables {SAφA/N}, its
variance σ2(Φ) can be easily expressed as
σ2(Φ) =
∑
A
∑
B
SASB
N2
σAB =
∑
A
S2Aσ
2
A
N2
+
∑
A
∑
B 6=A
SASB
N2
σAB
(E5)
where σAB denotes the covariance between the choices
φA and φB of two different connected components A and
B, and σ2A is the variance of φA. Now, since
σ2A ≡ 〈φ2A〉 − 〈φA〉2 = 1 (E6)
and since different connected components make statisti-
cally independent choices, it follows that
σAB ≡ 〈φAφB〉 − 〈φA〉〈φB〉 = δABσ2A = δAB (E7)
where δAB = 1 if A = B and δAB = 0 if A 6= B. Thus
the variance of Φ is simply
σ2(Φ) =
∑
A
S2A
N2
(E8)
which proves the last equality in eq.(E3).
Note that for ω = 0 there areN connected components
of size SA = 1 (all vertices are isolated) and therefore
σ20(Φ) = 1/N (the results of the Central Limit Theorem
are recovered). In the opposite limit ω = 1, the net-
work is a single connected component of size SA = N ,
which yields σ21(Φ) = 1. Thus the social coordination
C(ω) ≡ σω(Φ) varies from C(0) = 1/
√
N (no collective
behavior) to C(1) = 1 (perfect collective behavior). For
generic values of ω note that, since
∑
A SA = N , the
expression for σ2(Φ) in eq.(E8) has the form of an in-
verse participation ratio. This means that σ2(Φ) ≃ 1/n
if the sum over A is dominated by n terms of approx-
imately equal size. In particular, σ2(Φ) ≃ 1 if there is
one dominant connected component, while σ2(Φ) ≃ 1/N
if each connected component trivially contains only one
vertex. This result rephrases the connection between
the shape of P (Φ) and the underlying network topol-
ogy: when there is no giant component, the width of
P (Φ) is σ(Φ) ≃ 1/
√
N → 0, while when the giant com-
ponent is there the width of P (Φ) has the finite value
σ(Φ) ≃ 1. Thus when there is no giant component there
must be a single peak, while the presence of two peaks
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at finite distance necessarily implies the presence of the
giant component. In such a case, σ(Φ) gives an estimate
of the separation between the peaks.
Importantly, these results are valid as N goes to in-
finity, therefore our method to compute ωc as the value
marking a spontaneous symmetry breaking (from single-
peaked to double-peaked) in the probability Pω(Φ) pro-
vides a consistent way to define a ‘critical’ value, which
technically is defined only for infinite systems, even for
our inherently finite data. For infinite systems, our
method would yield the correct value of the critical
threshold. Other finite-size techniques would require as-
sumptions about how topological quantities scale with
network size. While for theoretical models (such as the
Erdo˝s-Re´nyi random graph [26]) it is possible to derive
these assumptions, for real systems this is not possible.
Appendix F: The modified Axelrod model
In the original version of the Axelrod model, N indi-
viduals (in social science jargon, ‘actors’) sitting at the
vertices of a social network are represented as vectors
of cultural traits (or features), that evolve through dis-
crete steps. In an elementary time-step, an individual i
and one of his neighbors (say j) are selected. Then the
normalized overlap oij ∈ [0, 1] between their cultural vec-
tors is computed as the fraction of identical components
(note that the overlap is related to the cultural distance
dij through oij = 1 − dij). With probability equal to
oij , the two actors interact: one of j’s traits, chosen ran-
domly among the set of traits where i and j differ, is
changed and set equal to the corresponding trait of i.
Otherwise nothing happens, and two other actors are se-
lected. These rules implement the two basic mechanisms
of social influence (neighboring actors tend to converge
culturally) and homophily (similar individuals interact
more frequently). The Axelrod model leads to the im-
portant conclusion that these two mechanisms do not
necessarily reinforce each other leading to a culturally
homogeneous society. In fact, the model predicts that
diversity is preserved: when two individuals become com-
pletely different (zero overlap), they no longer interact.
Thus in the allowed final configurations two neighboring
actors are either completely identical or completely dif-
ferent, and the society is split into cultural domains of
identical vectors, with no overlap between adjacent do-
mains. The average 〈ND〉 (over many realizations) of
the number ND of different domains in the final stage, or
equivalently the fraction 〈ND〉/N , is a convenient way to
measure the predicted cultural diversity as a function of
the model parameters.
As for the CB model, for our purposes it is impor-
tant to incorporate real data into the Axelrod model. In
this case, convenient generalizations have already been
proposed. While in the original model traits were non-
metric, a modification bringing us closer to real data is
the introduction of metric features and the consequent
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FIG. 8: The ultrametric properties of real opinions constrain
the evolution of cultural convergence even for infinite-range
interactions in social space. a) The average number 〈ND〉ω
of cultural domains obtained in the final state of the Axelrod
model as a function of ω, when the initial state is given by
real, shuffled, and random opinions. b) The average number
〈ND〉 of final cultural domains versus the numberNC of initial
connected components in the cultural graphs, for real, shuffled
and random opinions.
redefinition of cultural distance dij as a metric distance
between cultural vectors [18]. Another important vari-
ant introduces the effect of bounded confidence: Flache
and Macy [17] introduced a threshold θ such that, if
the overlap is smaller than or equal to θ, no interaction
takes place. Otherwise, it takes place with probability oij
(the original version of the model is recovered if θ = 0).
Clearly, θ has exactly the same meaning as 1− ω, where
ω is the confidence we introduced above. The threshold
compensates the effect that, as the number of features
grows, the presence of completely different pairs of agents
becomes unlikely. It also allows to reproduce more realis-
tically the fact that individuals are uninfluenced by each
other if they are different enough, not necessarily on each
and every opinion they have. [34]
The above modifications allowed us to use the empiri-
cal cultural vectors (rather than commonly assumed uni-
formly random vectors) as the starting configuration, and
study the final diversity predicted by the model. In order
to simulate long-range online-like dynamics we assumed
that the ‘social’ network is a complete graph. Since we
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never found more than one individual with exactly the
same cultural vector, the initial number of cultural do-
mains was always N = 500 for each sampled group. In
fig.8a we report the average number 〈ND〉ω of different
cultural domains in the final state of the dynamics, as
a function of ω = 1 − θ for real, shuffled and random
opinions. As can be seen, for large values of θ (small ω)
the final fraction of culturally homogeneous domains is
finite (at the extreme θ = 1 there is no evolution from the
starting configuration and the initial vectors remain all
distinct), while for small values of θ (large ω) the same
fraction is of order 1/N (and vanishes at the extreme
θ = 0 corresponding to the ordinary Axelrod model).
This means that the final cultural diversity decreases as ω
increases. With respect to real data, the curved for shuf-
fled and random data are moved rightwards. Naively, if
combined with our previous results, this finding appears
to confirm the expectation that larger cultural diversity is
only reached in a regime (small ω) where short-term col-
lective behavior is weak or absent, and conversely strong
collective behavior can only exist for large values of ω
which suppress cultural heterogeneity in the long run.
Moreover, this appears to apply equally to real, shuffled
and random data.
However, this conclusion is incorrect. In fig.8b we show
the average number 〈ND〉 of final different cultural do-
mains versus the number NC of initial connected compo-
nents in the underlying cultural network, both obtained
for various values of the threshold ω and for the three
usual cases of real, shuffled and random data. We find
that, for a given value of NC , real data are those that
achieve the largest level of long-term cultural heterogene-
ity (value of 〈ND〉). Indeed, for real data the realized
value of 〈ND〉 is the largest possible[35] (〈ND〉 ≈ NC) in-
dicating that cultural convergence is confined within the
initial connected components, each of which eventually
becomes a single cultural domain. By contrast, in ran-
domized data there are less final cultural domains than
initial connected components, indicating that the latter
often ‘merge’ into larger cultural domains.
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